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ASHCROFT V. IQBAL AND BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMMAND 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES 
PETER LAUMANN* 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the federal government instituted a wide range of pro-
grams ostensibly aimed at ensuring short- and long-term homeland security.1  As part of the government’s 
response, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interrogated over one thousand individuals believed to 
have terrorist ties, holding 762 of these individuals on immigration charges.2  This group was further nar-
rowed to 184 “high interest” detainees who were held in isolation from outside contact.3 
Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim citizen of Pakistan, was among these detainees.  After being detained in the 
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit of Brooklyn’s Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), Iqbal 
brought Bivens4 claims against a variety of government officials.  His claims alleged mistreatment connected 
to his detention at MDC and an unconstitutional policy of discrimination against Muslim-Americans, par-
ticularly those of Middle Eastern background.5  The lawsuit ultimately provided the Supreme Court with a 
vehicle to radically alter pleading standards, extending the more limited decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly6 to require a new “plausibility” standard for lawsuits under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 
This new pleading standard has been criticized as a departure from long-standing precedent8 and 
from the Supreme Court’s proper role in promulgating and interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.9  However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal also represents a radical step in another area, as the 
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 1 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that the Constitution im-
plicitly created a cause of action against federal officials for violations of the Fourth Amendment). 
 5 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666-68. 
 6 Twombly created a new standard for lawsuits against telecommunications providers alleging monopolistic 
parallel actions under the Sherman Act.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007). 
 7 See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of 
Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 404 (2011).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (establishing the pleading standard 
necessary to file a claim in federal court). 
 8 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (holding that a “complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief”). 
 9 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 
JUDICATURE 109, 110 (2009) (arguing that as a result of the higher “plausibility” pleading standard from Twombly, “lower 
federal courts so inclined are essentially free to use that standard to rid their dockets of cases deemed to place unwarranted 
demands on the judiciary or that are for some other reason disfavored”). 
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Court also seemingly swept away supervisory liability in Bivens actions against government officials.10  
While the majority treated this as a clear extension of precedent, Justice Souter’s dissent noted that the gov-
ernment had actually conceded supervisory liability under Bivens, and that the Court had, sua sponte, articu-
lated a new rule doing away with respondeat superior under Bivens and 42 U.S. § 1983.11 
The purpose of this article is to analyze how this new rule—apparently abolishing the previously 
existing supervisory liability rule in suits against government officials—affects litigation against United 
States government actors under human rights treaties, statutes, and conventions.  In numerous historical 
prosecutions for egregious human rights violations, supervisors have been held criminally liable for the ac-
tions of inferiors.  The United States was directly involved in several of these proceedings, including the Nu-
remberg Tribunals and the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia, Japan, and Rwanda. 
Part I will trace the development of government actors’ liability in the United States, particularly 
via the Ku Klux Klan Act12 and the above-mentioned Bivens doctrine.  This section will also address gov-
ernment officials’ supervisory liability under these doctrines.  Part II will analyze prosecutions of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights violations, particularly those involving the devel-
opment of command liability.  Part III will discuss command liability’s growth as a doctrine now firmly 
rooted in customary international law.  Part IV will then assess whether Iqbal’s holding regarding superviso-
ry liability can be reconciled with customary international law and binding international law obligations con-
tained in statutes, treaties, conventions, and other agreements delineating clearly required or prohibited con-
duct. 
I. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL SUPERVISORY LIABILITY IN AMERICAN LAW 
A. Introducing Bivens and § 1983 
For more than a century after the ratification of the Constitution, American law did not provide a 
cause of action creating damages liability for the actions of government officials.  It was not until the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (known more popularly as the Ku Klux Klan Act) during the post-Civil 
War Reconstruction Era,13 that government actors could be held civilly liable for actions violating federal 
constitutional or statutory law.  The Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was originally intended to address the 
perceived malfeasance of southern officials, who were alleged to have worked hand-in-hand with the Klan to 
continue pre-War brutalization and oppression of freed African-Americans.14 
Section 1983 created a cause of action against state officials for violations of federal law, but fed-
eral officials would not be subject to such a cause of action until 1971, following the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.15  The Court, in promul-
gating the Bivens doctrine, explained that federal courts have the authority to fashion remedies—including 
monetary damages—for violations of Fourth Amendment rights even absent explicit authorization in the text 
                                                                
 10 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675-78. 
 11 See id. at 686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 12 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).  The Act is commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act 
because of its original purpose of combating Southern officials’ complicity with Klan violence against African Americans 
during the Reconstruction period. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern Vision of 
42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 534-37 (1985) (detailing the early history of the “Ku Klux Klan Act”). 
 13 See Gormley, supra note 12. 
 14 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-74 (1961) (describing the concerns and debates leading to the pas-
sage of the Ku Klux Klan Act). 
 15 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding 
that federal officials would be liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871). 
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of the Constitution or federal statute.16  The Court later expanded the breadth of the Bivens doctrine to in-
clude other constitutional violations by government officials.17 
B. Defenses to Bivens and § 1983 Claims: “Special Factors” and Immunities 
These two mechanisms for remedying unconstitutional conduct—Bivens and § 1983—are general-
ly identical for the purposes of determining issues of defenses, immunities, and damages.18  However, there 
are key differences.  In particular, Bivens defendants have a wider array of protections available.19  Bivens 
and § 1983 are distinct in substance; § 1983 has been held to encompass claims involving any constitutional 
violation, while Bivens has been circumscribed to a relatively small sphere of constitutional claims.20  Addi-
tionally, the Bivens doctrine includes a vague caveat that exempts claims where there are “special factors 
counseling hesitation.”21  Still, both Bivens and § 1983 claims must overcome qualified, and sometimes ab-
solute, immunity defenses. 
1. “Special Factors Counseling Hesitation” 
Generally, the substance of the claims brought against government officials in the human rights 
context fits within the nexus of Bivens claims already recognized by the Supreme Court.  Torture, unreason-
able seizure, indefinite detention, and denial of due process have each been included in the ambit of Bivens 
claims.22  However, some human rights claims may fall outside the strict boundaries of preexisting Bivens 
claims, and certain courts are reticent to extend the doctrine beyond the borders already established.  For ex-
ample, in the recently decided Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit dismissed a Bivens claim against Secre-
tary Ashcroft for direction of a program whereby detainees were rendered to countries where they would 
clearly be tortured.23 
Arar illustrates the use—and, some might say, the danger—of “special factors” to limit the amena-
bility of government officials to sensitive Bivens claims.  The Second Circuit explained, “in the context of 
extraordinary rendition, [a Bivens] action would have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign poli-
                                                                
 16 Id. at 396. 
 17 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (pleading for Eighth Amendment Bivens action); Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (pleading for Fifth Amendment Bivens action). 
 18 See William N. Evans, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling Bivens from Section 1983, 77 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010). 
 19 As this paper is mainly focused on claims implicating Bivens, I will only note here that § 1983 defendants 
acting as state officials may have an Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity defense available, which Bivens de-
fendants do not. Otherwise, § 1983 claims are more plaintiff-friendly than Bivens claims.  See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 20 See Evans, supra note 18, at 1405 (explaining that claims under Bivens are limited to those where there is 
no adequate and alternative remedy available). 
 21 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
 22 See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (recognizing a Bivens action for retaliatory and malicious 
prosecution); Carlson, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (allowing Eighth Amendment Bivens remedy for cruel treatment of prison in-
mates); Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (permitting a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations).  Professor Judith Resnik has 
drawn parallels between domestic Bivens and § 1983 claims and the types of claims brought by alleged human rights 
abuse victims post-9/11.  She argues that the recent jurisprudence should not be taken in isolation, but woven within prior 
decisions protecting constitutional rights. See generally Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal 
Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010). 
 23 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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cy, and the security of the nation, and that fact counsels hesitation.”24  A starker application of this “special 
factors” framework was apparent in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Stanley to bar service-
men from bringing Bivens claims after the United States Army had administered LSD to soldiers in order to 
“study the effects of the drug on human subjects.”25  The “special factor” found to be compelling in Stanley 
was the Court’s view that “uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.”26 
It is not entirely clear what amounts to a sufficiently pressing “special factor,” but it is apparent 
that the modern Supreme Court, as well as several circuits, is especially concerned with claims that ostensi-
bly implicate national security.  The D.C. Circuit seized on this rationale in Ali v. Rumsfeld,27 decided in 
June 2011.  Judge Henderson explained for a divided panel that Bivens claims brought by foreign nationals 
could not proceed because the Supreme Court had not recognized extraterritorial constitutional rights of for-
eign nationals prior to Boumediene v. Bush28 in 2008, and even after the Boumediene decision it was not es-
tablished that non-citizens could claim extraterritorial protection from torture under the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments.29  Furthermore, “even if . . . the plaintiffs could claim the protections of the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments, [the court] would decline to sanction aBivenscause of action because special factors coun-
sel[ed] against doing so.”30  The majority, quoting from its own decision in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 
explained that the “special factor” in Ali was a concern that “the special needs of foreign affairs must stay 
[the court’s] hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials for alleg-
edly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad,” and “the danger of foreign citi-
zens’ using the courts . . . to obstruct the foreign policy of [the U.S.] Government is sufficiently acute that 
[the court] must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.”31 
It is difficult to distinguish the D.C. Circuit’s asserted special factor in human rights claims from 
blanket immunity from liability for illegal acts taken abroad.32  The Supreme Court has not advanced such a 
rationale to bar suits against government officials by foreign citizens, and other circuits have not adopted the 
D.C. Circuit’s reasoning. 
                                                                
 24 Id. 
 25 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987).  James Stanley suffered greatly for his involvement in 
what he was told was a “program ostensibly designed to test the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment as de-
fenses against chemical warfare.” Id.  Stanley “suffered from hallucinations and periods of incoherence and memory loss, 
was impaired in his military performance, and would on occasion ‘awake from sleep at night and, without reason, violent-
ly beat his wife and children, later being unable to recall the entire incident.’” Id.  Furthermore, “[h]e was discharged from 
the Army in 1969. Id.  One year later, his marriage dissolved because of the personality changes wrought by the LSD.” Id. 
 26 Id. at 683. 
 27 Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 
(2008)). 
 28 Boumediene recognized the right of non-citizen detainees to seek writs of habeas corpus in American feder-
al courts, absent sufficient justification for invoking the Suspension Clause.  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
 29 Ali, 649 F.3d at 771-72.  In finding qualified immunity for the government defendants, the D.C. Circuit, 
somewhat cruelly, continued to refrain from recognizing the existence of a right to be free of torture at all, considering 
such a decision “an essentially academic exercise.” Id. at 772-73.  Ali also involved claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 
which is discussed in more detail infra note 56. 
 30 Id. at 774. 
 31 Id. (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
 32 Cf. Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day’s Work? Scope of Employment, the Absolute Immunity 
Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 233 (2008) 
(noting that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act now includes an exception waiving foreign state sovereign immunity in 
damages actions, but only where the state is specifically designated as a foreign terrorist organization). 
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2. Immunity to Suit 
A second layer of defense available to government officials takes the form of a variety of immuni-
ties to suit and liability for impermissible actions.  Generally, these immunities are non-statutory and are the 
product of jurisprudence designed to ensure that government officials can perform their duties without ex-
cessive fear of legal liability.  Government official immunity takes two broad forms: absolute immunity, 
which provides a total shield to liability for certain government officials and actions, and qualified immunity, 
which offers a two-step rubric for deciding whether an official can be held liable for an illegal act. 
In human rights claims, qualified immunity is the applicable framework for deciding government 
officials’ liability.  As the Supreme Court explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, “[f]or executive officials in 
general . . . our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.”33  The doctrine of qualified 
immunity, as articulated in Harlow, states that “government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”34  The two-part 
test for qualified immunity therefore asks (1) whether there was a statutory or constitutional right allegedly 
violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. 
The modern Supreme Court has altered the process of determining whether qualified immunity 
should be granted.  Traditionally, a court’s initial obligation was to decide whether a federally-protected 
right (statutory or constitutional) had been alleged.35  Because the court would still have the opportunity to 
decide whether the right was clearly established, this approach balanced the competing goals of protecting 
federal rights while preventing over-deterrence of government officials through fears of excessive liability.  
Once the right had been clearly recognized, future misbehaving government officials could not claim the 
shield of qualified immunity. 
The Supreme Court upended this process for deciding the question of qualified immunity in Pear-
son v. Callahan, which abolished the requirement for deciding the existence of a federally protected right in 
assessing qualified immunity.36  Under the prior Saucier regime, qualified immunity had meaning; it gave 
public officials “one bite at the apple,” but provided notice going forward, both of the rights of individuals 
and the limitations on government actors.37  However, under Pearson, courts need never decide whether 
such a right or limitation exists, regardless of how often an alleged violation is challenged in court.  Pearson 
thus closes the distance between traditional qualified immunity and absolute immunity. 
C. Supervisory Liability Under Bivens and § 1983 
Bivens and § 1983 are also substantially identical in determining supervisory liability.  Section 
1983, with its longer history, wider range of substantive causes of action, and higher volume of litigation, 
                                                                
 33 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).  Exceptions, where absolute rather than qualified immunity 
is granted, exist for “prosecutors and similar officials, executive officials engaged in adjudicative functions, and the Presi-
dent of the United States.” Id.  See also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (applying qualified immunity 
where plaintiff claimed that Ashcroft used material witness warrants as a pretext for detaining suspected terrorists). 
 34 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 35 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue 
must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts 
alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”) 
 36 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 37 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206 (“Qualified immunity operates . . . to protect officers from the sometimes ‘hazy 
border between excessive and acceptable force,’ and to ensure that before they are subject to suit, officers are on notice 
their conduct is unlawful.”) (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
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provides the bulk of pre-Iqbal guidance on the boundaries of government official supervisory liability.  
However, even the question of supervisory liability under § 1983 did not reach the Supreme Court for over a 
century after the Act’s passage.  Rizzo v. Goode, decided in 1976, was the Court’s first direct statement on 
supervisory liability under § 1983.38  In Rizzo, the Supreme Court announced an “affirmative link” approach 
to supervisory liability; in other words, plaintiffs must establish some direct agency between the allegedly 
illegal actions of a supervisor and his or her inferiors.39 
After Rizzo, lower federal courts fashioned their approaches to supervisory liability by following 
Supreme Court holdings on municipality liability under § 1983.40  Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of the City of New York was the first Supreme Court case to establish that the actions of municipal officials 
could render a municipality liable under § 1983, provided that the municipality—through its supervisory 
agents—held some legal responsibility for the allegedly improper conduct.41  A showing of culpability on 
behalf of supervisory policymakers satisfied the “affirmative link” component of Rizzo.  The link could arise 
from direct decisions by an identifiable supervisor or from a “policy or custom” of prohibited conduct on 
behalf of the municipality.42  In order to qualify as a policymaker, a supervisor’s “edicts or acts [must] fairly 
be said to represent official policy.”43  After Rizzo and Monell, almost all federal circuits applied the Su-
preme Court’s municipal liability approach to cases involving claims against supervising officials under § 
1983.44   
While governmental supervisory liability was a relatively recent development in American juris-
prudence, the doctrine quickly and thoroughly took hold in federal courts in the period between Rizzo and 
Iqbal.  Government officials could be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of their inferiors if the su-
pervisors (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged conduct, (2) responded with “deliberate 
indifference to or tacit authorization” of those practices, and (3) there was a link between the supervisor’s 
inaction and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.45 
Placed in the context of this decades-long line of cases, in which even the conservative Rehnquist 
Court acknowledged supervisory liability under § 1983, the Iqbal holding is radical.  As the Iqbal majority 
explained: 
In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action . . . the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Ab-
sent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only 
liable for his or her own misconduct.  In the context of determining whether there is a vi-
olation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than 
knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional 
                                                                
 38 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
 39 Id. at 371.  The plaintiffs in Rizzo sought an injunction against various Philadelphia officials to correct on-
going abuses by the Philadelphia police.  Frank Rizzo, the Philadelphia Police Commissioner and later Mayor, was notori-
ous for highly controversial law enforcement practices during his tenure in both offices.  See, e.g., Jonathan Storm, Ch. 12 
Looks at the Life of Rizzo, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 6, 1999, at D1. 
 40 See Evans, supra note 18, at 1412. 
 41 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 42 Id. at 694-95.  See also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (explaining that “deliberate in-
difference” on behalf of municipal policymakers can form the basis for §1983 supervisory liability). 
 43 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
 44 Prior to Iqbal, “[m]ost, perhaps all, of the circuits agreed that actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct 
by subordinates and deliberate indifference to it were sufficient for supervisory liability.” Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional 
Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 293 (2010).  See also Ev-
ans, supra note 18, at 1412-13 (providing a survey of cases from various circuits reflecting this consensus). 
 45 See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from 
his or her superintendent responsibilities.46 
Furthermore, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the offi-
cial’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”47   
Even commentators approving of the recent Iqbal abolition of supervisory liability in Bivens ac-
tions have expressed reservations about the Supreme Court’s decision to issue such a sweeping holding on a 
question that was conceded by the government and, ostensibly, not actually before the Court.48  Strikingly, 
the majority did not discuss at any length its own precedents recognizing supervisory liability under § 1983, 
including Monell and City of Canton v. Harris, even though these cases clearly established theories of liabil-
ity based on supervisory inaction rather than active constitutional violations.  However, it is not entirely clear 
that Iqbal abolished § 1983 and Bivens supervisory liability. 
More recently, in Connick v. Thompson, the Court recognized the continuing viability of supervi-
sory liability, despite striking down a § 1983 “failure-to-train” claim alleged against a defendant district at-
torney.49  The Iqbal majority explained that vicarious liability and respondeat superior are not applicable in 
§ 1983 and Bivens claims; the majority also explicitly tied the two causes of action together for the purposes 
of liability rules.50  Taking into account that the Iqbal majority deemed supervisory liability a “misnomer” in 
these contexts, the standard for deliberate indifference appears to be such that a supervisor’s inaction actually 
amounts to a constitutional deprivation itself, similar to a “failure to warn” claim in products liability law.51  
                                                                
 46 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667.  It is arguable that the majority mischaracterized Iqbal’s actual allegations regarding 
Ashcroft’s (and his fellow officials’) culpability.  The Court wrote, “[Respondent] argues that, under a theory of ‘supervi-
sory liability,’ petitioners can be liable for ‘knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of discriminatory crite-
ria to make classification decisions among detainees.’” Id. (citing Iqbal Brief 45-46).  The Court equated this with an ar-
gument that “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s 
violating the Constitution.” Id.  However, the language from Iqbal’s brief closely tracks Supreme Court precedent regard-
ing supervisory liability under § 1983—that is, knowledge and deliberate indifference and/or tacit approval—and seems to 
allege more than “mere knowledge of [a] subordinate’s” wrongdoing. Id. 
 47 Id. at 677. 
 48 Professor Nahmod is one such commentator, who, while generally agreeing with the Court’s supervisory 
liability holding in Iqbal, nevertheless asserted that 
whatever one thinks should be the proper standard for supervisory liability, it is surprising from a process perspective that 
the Court announced that it was adopting the constitutional approach to supervisory liability under circumstances of no 
briefing and no argument . . . .  At the very least, the Court should have explained itself much more than it did. 
Nahmod, supra note 44, at 292-93. 
 49 See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).  John Thompson spent fourteen years on death 
row before being exonerated by DNA evidence illegally withheld by Harry Connick, Sr.’s New Orleans District Attor-
ney’s Office.  He subsequently sued, and was awarded $14 million in damages—$1 million for each year spent on death 
row.  The Supreme Court, in overturning this award, held that the prosecutor’s office could not be held liable under a fail-
ure to train theory based on what they characterized as a single Brady violation. Id. at 1366.  As the dissenting opinion and 
subsequent cases make clear, it is highly dubious whether the factual background of Connick can legitimately be treated as 
a single, isolated constitutional violation. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See also Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 
(2012) (overturning Juan Smith’s murder conviction due to the illegal failure of the New Orleans D.A.’s office—still un-
der Harry Connick, Sr.—to disclose that the prosecution’s sole eyewitness could not identify alleged attacker for months 
after the night of the quintuple murder, where there was no other evidence linking defendant to the crime). 
 50 Iqbal, 555 U.S. at 676. 
 51 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SUPPLIERS OF CHATTELS § 492A (2007) (defining scope 
of manufacturer’s duty to warn when “he has knowledge, or by application of reasonable, developed human skill and fore-
sight should have knowledge” of possible harm through use of product). 
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Connick affirms the continued post-Iqbal existence of supervisory liability under § 1983, with the caveat that 
a single violation of individual rights cannot satisfy a deliberate indifference standard. 
In two cases decided in the months after Ali v. Rumsfeld, federal courts declined to extend the D.C. 
Circuit’s logic.  Each case involved the Bivens actions of American citizens, rather than foreign nationals, 
who alleged extraterritorial torture and other substantive due process violations.  One of these cases, Vance 
v. Rumsfeld,52 is informative for several reasons.  Although the Seventh Circuit panel’s decision has been 
vacated pending en banc review, the opinion may illustrate how circuits will treat both extraterritorial Bivens 
claims against federal officials and supervisory liability in light of Iqbal.  Judge Hamilton, writing for the 
court, began by distinguishing the type of Bivens claim brought by Javaid Iqbal from that brought by the 
plaintiffs in Vance.  Unlike Iqbal, who brought a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim for discrim-
inatory treatment, the Vance plaintiffs, claiming torture and physical mistreatment, needed to meet the lower 
standard of “deliberate indifference, as in analogous cases involving prison and school officials in domestic 
settings.”53  Finding that “the plaintiffs . . . sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibil-
ity,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that the case involved “an unusual situation where issues concerning 
harsh interrogation techniques and detention policies were decided . . . at the highest levels of the federal 
government,” and 
the plaintiffs’ pleadings, if true, . . . sufficiently alleged not only Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
personal responsibility in creating the policies that led to the plaintiffs’ treatment but also 
deliberate indifference by Secretary Rumsfeld in failing to act to stop the torture of the[] 
detainees despite actual knowledge of reports of detainee abuse.54 
 
Vance, if upheld en banc by the Seventh Circuit or by the Supreme Court, signals a brighter future 
for human rights claims against malfeasant government officials in the post-Iqbal era than one might initially 
anticipate.  It addresses the Iqbal description of supervisory liability as a “misnomer” by defining deliberate 
indifference as a discrete constitutional violation that is tied to knowledge and foreseeability of the underly-
ing harm.  The Seventh Circuit panel found the plaintiffs’ allegations that Secretary Rumsfeld knew about 
and failed to prevent torture and other constitutional violations—even if he had not actually personally di-
rected these policies—sufficient to establish a Bivens claim.55 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has a long history of participation in human rights litigation involving high-
ranking foreign officials.  Such litigation has occurred through American federal courts and through in-
volvement in international tribunals overseeing prosecutions of alleged war criminals.  The Alien Tort Stat-
ute (ATS) allows non-citizens to bring claims in federal courts for alleged “violation[s] of thelaw of nation-
sor atreaty of the United States,” which provides an avenue for human rights litigation in domestic courts.56  
                                                                
 52 See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc and op. vacated, Oct. 28, 2011. 
 53 Id. at 599. 
 54 Id. at 600. 
 55 See id. at 604-05. 
 56 The Alien Tort Statute, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, has existed in some form since the original Judiciary 
Act of 1789.  However, the ATS went largely unused until the past half-century, a shift that coincided with the growth of 
the international human rights movement following World War II and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  See 
generally Jordan D. Shepherd, Note, When Sosa Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 2318, 2321-24 (2011) (briefly tracing the pre-Filártiga history of the Alien Tort Statute). 
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Throughout the past half-century, the United States has both actively engaged in human rights prosecutions 
of officials in international venues and opened its courts to domestic claims of human rights abuses. 
A. Domestic Litigation Involving Human Rights Violations: The Alien Tort Statute 
In 1976, Joelito Filártiga was kidnapped, tortured, and ultimately killed by Américo Peña-Irala.57  
Filártiga’s family brought suit against Peña-Irala in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York.  The suit was unique in two critical aspects: both parties were non-citizens and the plaintiffs 
brought suit in American federal court for harms that occurred entirely in another country.  Filártiga’s terri-
ble ordeal took place in Paraguay, where Peña-Irala was a local Inspector General of Police.  After Joelito’s 
death, the Filártigas fled to America, where they subsequently discovered that Peña-Irala was visiting on a 
tourist visa.  While Peña-Irala remained in immigration detention, the victim’s family filed a claim seeking 
ten million dollars for a variety of human rights offenses under the Alien Tort Statute.  After the suit was 
dismissed in lower court for lack of jurisdiction,58 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard the Filártigas’ 
appeal.  Judge Kaufman’s opinion recognized universal subject matter jurisdiction for violations of “estab-
lished norms of the international law of human rights.”59  Personal jurisdiction over Peña-Irala and the Filár-
tigas, the only remaining obstacle, was satisfied by the actual physical presence of both parties within the 
United States.60  The Filártiga decision gave life to the ATS as a means of vindicating human rights in a 
competent and fair forum—the federal courts of the United States of America.61 
Subsequent decisions have narrowed—or clarified—the scope of the ATS as a vehicle for pursuing 
human rights claims.  The Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the Statute is jurisdictional 
and does not on its own give rise to causes of action not recognized in treaties or customary international 
law.62  Thus, the range of available causes of action is limited to those created by a treaty to which the Unit-
ed States is a party and those arising from widely recognized international norms.63  This restricted scope of 
                                                                
 57 See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 58 Id. at 880. 
 59 Id.; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694-95 (1900) (recognizing “settled rule[s] of international 
law” by “the general assent of civilized nations” as part of domestic law to be applied in American jurisprudence). 
 60 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 885.  The Court quickly disposed of Peña-Irala’s opposition to personal jurisdiction, 
explaining that “[c]ommon law courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort claims between individu-
als over whom they exercise personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.” Id. 
 61 Another statutory framework for obtaining relief for human rights violations exists, but in a much more 
limited fashion than for that under the Alien Tort Statute.  The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) functions as a partial 
waiver of sovereign immunity by the Federal Government, but it contains a number of exceptions that severely undermine 
its usefulness as a tool in human rights litigation.  In particular, the FTCA exempts any injury suffered on foreign soil from 
permissible suits.  Additionally, the FTCA does not hold officials individually accountable for violations of human rights. 
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700-01 (2004) (noting that “the FTCA 
‘was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific 
exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances’” and that the 
waiver of immunity is significantly limited by the Act’s exception for any claim arising in a foreign country) (citing Rich-
ards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962)). 
 62 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-13.  Sosa arose after the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) used Jose Francisco 
Sosa, a Mexican national, to abduct Humberto Alvarez-Machain, also a Mexican national, on suspicion of torturing and 
murdering Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a DEA agent.  Both the abduction and the alleged torture-murder occurred entirely 
in Mexico.  Alvarez-Machain was transported to the United States for a trial in which he was acquitted of all charges.  He 
then brought suit against Sosa under the ATS and against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
 63 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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the ATS limits its applicability to the clearest and universally acknowledged of human rights violations, such 
as the torture-killing suffered by Joelito Filártiga in Paraguay.64 
While a unanimous Court held that Humberto Alvarez-Machain’s claim was not cognizable under 
the ATS, the majority rejected Justice Scalia’s argument for limiting claims under the statute only to those 
specific substantive claims recognized at the time of the Act’s passage.65  The majority’s holding instead al-
lowed federal courts to recognize “claim[s] based on the present-day law of nations . . . rest[ing] on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms.”66  The range of substantive claims available to ATS plaintiffs is 
therefore not strictly limited to those identifiable in the international law corpus of 1789, but expands, and 
theoretically also contracts, with the development of present-day international law. 
Federal courts have been hesitant to hold American officials and entities amenable to suit in analo-
gous human rights cases.  The Supreme Court has granted immunity from suit to military contractors for de-
fective product manufacturing claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),67 while lower 
courts have shielded contractors from liability for torture68 and corporations from liability for participation in 
illegal rendition of detainees.69  In fact, prior to Vance, whose status is in flux, there does not appear to have 
been a case in which an American official or entity has been held liable under the ATS for violations arising 
out of American activities abroad. 
The D.C. Circuit’s holdings in Saleh v. Titan and Ali v. Rumsfeld reflect both a double standard 
and a trap for plaintiffs: a double standard by which an American statute can be used to hold foreign, but not 
American, officials liable for violations occurring entirely in foreign jurisdictions, and a trap by which plain-
tiffs can neither recover from the officials who directed or supervised impermissible acts nor the private ac-
tors who carried them out.70  Beyond Ali’s limitation of the permissible range of substantive causes of action 
                                                                
 64 One early example of the difficulty of recognizing “universal” norms of international law is evident in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, in which the plaintiffs alleged that the Libyan state had sponsored and otherwise aided ter-
rorist attacks against civilian targets in Israel. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The opinion, unanimously finding a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, nevertheless produced a separate opinion from each of the three presiding judges, each disa-
greeing about the merits of the Filártiga decision in the period before Sosa provided definitive clarity on the reach of the 
ATS.  In particular, Judge Edwards’ concurring opinion, in assessing claims against the Libyan Republic, wrestled with 
the question of whether terrorism was a universally accepted violation of international law giving rise to ATS subject-
matter jurisdiction, ultimately concluding that it was not. Id. at 795-96 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 65 Justice Scalia argued that “creating a federal command (federal common law) out of ‘international norms[]’ 
and then constructing a cause of action to enforce that command through the purely jurisdictional grant of the ATS[] is 
nonsense upon stilts.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 66 Id. at 725. 
 67 See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (holding that government contractors cannot be 
held liable for design defects in military equipment that satisfied United States approved specifications when the contrac-
tor had made the United States aware of the dangers of the use of that equipment). 
 68 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  The D.C. Circuit held in Ali v. Rumsfeld that the 
Westfall Act precludes ATS liability for government officials for actions that clearly violate international laws and norms, 
while also holding in Saleh that private contractors that participate in torture, under the direction of the same government 
officials, are not subject to international norms and customs banning these practices. Ali, 649 F.3d at 762, Saleh, 580 F.3d 
at 15. 
 69 See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (May 
16, 2011) (dismissing litigation against private corporations that provided flight planning and logistical support services to 
U.S. Government in rendition of detainees). 
 70 See generally Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act 
on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1718 (2008) (arguing that the Westfall Act was never intended to 
preempt liability for violations of international norms, laws, and customs under the ATS and proposing a legislative revi-
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under the Alien Tort Statute and Bivens, discussed above, the D.C. Circuit also held that the Westfall Act,71 
which generally functions as a bar to FTCA claims, also provides an absolute defense to any ATS claims 
arising out of a government official’s employment.72  This is a sweeping view of the Westfall Act, which 
was only written to protect federal employees from tort suits arising out of actions taken “within the scope of 
. . . employment.”73  However, the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the Westfall Act defines intentional, unconstitu-
tional, and illegal—rather than merely discretionary, negligent, and tortuous—conduct as “within the scope” 
of government officials’ employment. 
The Westfall Act—officially titled the Federal Employees LiabilityReform and Tort Compensa-
tionAct—owes its name to the Supreme Court decision Westfall v. Erwin, which exposed federal employees 
to liability for non-statutory state tort actions.74  Congress quickly responded to the Westfall holding by 
“grant[ing] . . . federal employee[s] suit immunity . . . when ‘actingwithin the scope of [their] office or em-
ployment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.’”75  Additionally, the Act was designed “to 
shield covered employees not only from liability but from suit.”76  In Ali, the D.C. Circuit sought to place its 
holding in line with Sosa, emphasizing the jurisdictional nature of the ATS and arguing that a “claim brought 
under the ATS . . . does not allege ‘a violation of a statute of the United States’ satisfying the Westfall Act 
exception [allowing employees to be held liable].”77  However, the ATS embraces more than violations of 
the law of nations; § 1350 also allows suits under American treaties and other non-common law.78  In nu-
merous cases considering the ATS after the passage of the Westfall Act, no Supreme Court decision has ever 
held—implicitly, explicitly, or otherwise—that the Westfall Act abrogated the ATS. 
It is difficult to reconcile the obligatory nature of international law and customs, as expressed in 
the age-old The Pacquete Habana case,79 with a holding that commission of acts in violation of those laws 
and customs are within the scope of an official’s employment.  In fact, the Supreme Court fashioned the Ex 
parte Young doctrine for § 1983 cases to recognize that state officials cannot claim Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity for actions in violation of the Constitution and certain federal laws, because those ac-
tions are inherently outside the scope of an official’s employment as a public servant.80  Furthermore, many 
of the ATS claims pressed against federal officials are rooted in long-standing, even famous, human rights 
laws and practices.  At least some of these laws include obligatory enforcement provisions.  For example, the 
                                                                
sion to clarify this Congressional intent). 
 71 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 
4563 (1988). 
 72 Ali, 649 F.3d at 774-75. 
 73 See Lin, supra note 70, at 1728-29 (providing an overview of legislative history and context leading to the 
passage of the Westfall Act following Westfall v. Ervin.  484 U.S. 292 (1988)).  The argument for the Westfall Act’s ap-
plicability to ATS claims generally springs from the proposition that the Act provides a defense to FTCA claims against 
the government, and the ATS, as a jurisdictional statute, on its own, does not create a cause of action where one is other-
wise barred.  See, e.g., Ali, 649 F.3d at 775 (“the ATS ‘is strictly a jurisdictional statute’ that ‘does not confer rights nor 
does it impose obligations or duties that, if violated, would trigger the Westfall Act’ . . . “)(citing Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 
644, 661 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 74 Westfall, 484 U.S. at 293. 
 75 Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 247 (2007). 
 76 Id. at 248. 
 77 Ali, 649 F.3d at 778 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b)(2)(B)). 
 78 This being the case, one might expect—and judicially demand—Congress to speak more explicitly if it 
sought to abrogate § 1350 so selectively.  The D.C. Circuit, in the process of seeking to cast itself as merely following So-
sa, performed a good deal of linguistic maneuvering to avoid the Court’s plain statement that “the domestic law of the 
United States recognizes the law of nations.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30. 
 79 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 80 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). 
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Geneva Conventions and Convention Against Torture require parties to actively seek out, prosecute, and 
remedy human rights violations.81 
Despite this narrowing of the ATS, the law has been effective in providing relief against notorious 
human rights abusers who have ventured into the boundaries of American courts’ personal jurisdiction.  
Judge Newman, writing for the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadžić, captured the unique place of the statute 
in our legal culture: “[m]ost Americans would probably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities com-
mitted in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in 
Manhattan.”82  The ATS has also provided liability for the torture of Falun Gong practitioners in China and 
unionists in Guatemala,83 the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador,84 and non-
consenting pharmaceutical experimentation on individuals in Nigeria.85 
B. International Tribunals and Prosecutions of Human Rights Abuses Applying Command 
Responsibility 
The Nuremberg Trials are often considered the true beginning of human rights law.  Almost im-
mediately following the Allied victory in World War II, many of the most notorious perpetrators of the Hol-
ocaust, and related offenses, were brought to trial.  These early ad hoc tribunals were created by multilateral 
treaty and were unprecedented in scope and purpose.  Never before had courts been established to systemati-
cally prosecute human rights crimes.  The practice was so unheard of that the Allies were accused of “vic-
tors’ justice,” imposing punishment and extracting a pound of flesh from the defeated Axis powers for acts 
which were not explicitly prohibited under preexisting international law.86 
The United States, having emerged from the War as a superpower, played a key role in the Nu-
remberg proceedings.  The U.S., along with its allies, formed the International Military Tribunal in order to 
“punish the German leaders responsible for crimes committed during the war.”87  Justice Robert Jackson 
served as the Allies’ Chief Prosecutor, and the United States was a treaty party to the trials.88  In the cases 
against the most senior Nazi officials, “it was usually clear that offenses had been committed and that orders 
had been given at the highest level.”89 
The United States also pursued separate prosecutions of Nazi officials in military tribunals held in 
Germany.  Somewhat contrary to the recent Second Circuit holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
                                                                
 81 See The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol 1 of 1977; Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85. 
 82 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 83 See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing Guatema-
lan labor union workers); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing Falun Gong practitioners). 
 84 See Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
 85 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 86 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg?, 149 MIL. L. REV. 65, 66 
(1995) (describing criticism of Nuremberg as a “victor’s tribunal before which only the vanquished were called to ac-
count”). 
 87 Allison Marston Danner, The Nuremberg Industrialist Prosecutions and Aggressive War, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
651, 654 (2006).  See also Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 280 (establishing the International Mil-
itary Tribunal to prosecute the major war criminals of the European Axis for crimes against humanity such as persecution, 
deportation, and extermination). 
 88 Scharf, supra note 86, at 65-66. 
 89 See W.J. Fenrick, Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 103, 113 (1995). 
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Company90 (discussed below), the Allies secured convictions of individuals from various spheres of Nazi 
society, from government officials to private capitalists. The “Industrialist Cases,” for example, prosecuted 
German corporate executives under the theory that “these individuals encouraged Germany to make war on 
its neighbors for economic gain.”91  Private actor “responsibility [for human rights abuses] was ultimately 
codified during the Second World War in Control Council Law No. 10, which [also] recognized private indi-
vidual and corporate liability, as well-entrenched elements of international law.”92  More recently, the Sec-
ond Circuit weighed in on the breadth of the Alien Tort Statute as it related to corporate liability, holding in 
Kiobel that corporations could not be subject to liability under the ATS because they were not historically 
held liable for violations of human rights under customary international law.93 
While it is conceptually plausible, as Judge Cabranes argued in Kiobel, to differentiate between 
corporate entities and individual actors within corporations for the purposes of customary international law 
standards of liability, no case appears on the record in which corporate agents have been held liable under 
the ATS.  Relevant to this dearth of individual liability, the Kiobel decision, and others coming to the same 
conclusion, did not find that no human rights violation occurred, but instead found that corporations were not 
amenable to liability for human rights violations under customary international law.  In other words, the Ki-
obel holding, and similar decisions in other lower federal court cases, may create a plaintiffs’ catch-22 in 
which it is formally possible, but practically impossible, to ever hold corporations or their high-ranking offi-
cials liable under a command responsibility theory.  The contention that corporations and private actors were 
not held liable for such violations in customary international law is in tension with the Industrialist Cases.94 
Another significant series of post-World War II trials forced sixteen judges to defend their roles in 
reshaping the German legal regime to allow the atrocities that took place under Nazi rule.95  Ten of the six-
teen judges prosecuted in United States of America v. Josef Altstötter, etal.96 were convicted and sentenced 
to punishments, including prison time.97  The judges and lawyers held to account in these “Justice Trials” 
were not alleged to have participated in the human rights crimes perpetrated by their countrymen, but were 
found liable based on “the principle that lawyers and judges in a governmental regime bear a particular re-
sponsibility in certain circumstances” to prevent these abuses.98  Without even an allegation that the judges 
directed or oversaw the underlying crimes, the criminal convictions in the Justice Trials, carrying incarcera-
tion rather than merely civil penalties, rested on a level of intent and responsibility that falls below even the 
                                                                
 90 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 91 Danner, supra note 87, at 653 (drawing a parallel between attempts to hold corporate entities, particularly 
Halliburton, liable for abuses in American wars following 9/11 and the prosecutions following Nuremberg). 
 92 Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 91-92 (2011).  See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, at 1 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 93 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.  Somewhat paradoxically, Judge Cabranes explained that “the fact that a legal 
norm is found in most or even all ‘civilized nations’ does not make that norm a part of customary international law.” Id. at 
118.  Cf. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing claims brought against Exxon for human 
rights abuses perpetrated in Indonesia by its private security forces on the same basis as the decision in Kiobel). 
 94 See Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials’ Influence on Human Rights 
Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 322-23 (2008). The degree to which corporate 
liability has been recognized as a universal international norm or custom is up for debate. Whether Judge Cabranes’ ap-
proach is a tenable and realistic approach to liability for corporate malfeasance and responsibility particularly in the mod-
ern era of multinational corporations is up for debate, but this paper will leave that argument for another day. 
 95 See Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Abuse, Lawyers, and Criminal Responsibility, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 353, 
369 (2009). 
 96 United States of America v. Josef Altstötter, et al., 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948). 
 97 See Sands, supra note 95, at 369. 
 98 Id. 
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deliberate indifference standard articulated in more recent American jurisprudence. 
Coincident with the trials of Nazi officers, officials, and civilians were the Tokyo Tribunals, which 
extended command responsibility for the first time to political officials without direct involvement in alleged 
abuses.99  The Tokyo Tribunals not only considered direction of and involvement in abuses, but also “con-
sidered the responsibility of political and bureaucratic leaders for failure to act.”100  Under General 
Tomoyuki Yamashita’s leadership, “[Japanese] soldiers abused civilians, internees, and prisoners of war on 
an indescribably large scale,” but he claimed, “as a result of the success of American forces in disrupting his 
command and control, he had no knowledge of the crimes committed by his soldiers.”101  General Yamashita 
was ultimately sentenced to death even though 
[t]he prosecution could not prove that the General had actual knowledge of the crimes 
that his subordinates committed . . . [because] the Tribunal reasoned that the crimes were 
so widespread and conspicuous that General Yamashita must have either secretly or-
dered them or must have been aware of their commission.102 
Following the Nuremberg Trials, the United States was instrumental in founding the United Na-
tions and crafting many of its most crucial human rights standards.  The United States submitted the first 
draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, much of which is now integrated in the fabric of cus-
tomary international law,103 and helped craft many of the core human rights treaties and conventions follow-
ing the Holocaust.  The U.S. is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture, the Additional Protocol to the Gene-
va Conventions, and the Convention Against Genocide.  Each of these agreements is binding on treaty par-
ties, and each codifies universal protections claimed by human rights litigants in the ATS suits discussed 
above.  For example, the ICCPR prohibits the ethnic and religious discrimination alleged by Javaid Iqbal, 
while the Convention Against Torture addresses the treatment of detainees alleged in Vance. 
The U.S. was also at the forefront of establishing both modern international criminal tribunals in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and ensuring that human rights abusers were held to account in each forum.104  In 
fact, 
much of the cooperation from relevant governments received by the [International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Yugoslavia] was the direct or indirect consequence of pressure from 
Washington, D.C. . . . [and various] surrenders and transfers were the direct consequence 
of the United States threatening to withhold or block substantial financial assistance.105 
                                                                
 99 See Fenrick, supra note 89, at 117-18 (1995). 
 100 Id. at 116. 
 101 Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Mili-
tary Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 178-79 (2000). 
 102 Jordan Engelhardt, The Preeminent State: National Dominance in the Effort to Try Saddam Hussein, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 775, 788 (2008). 
 103 See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is it Still Right for the United 
States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 257 (2008). 
 104 See Richard Goldstone, A View from the Prosecution, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 380, 383 (2004).  The United 
States exercised its vote in support of both U.N. Security Council Resolutions establishing the ICTs for Rwanda and Yu-
goslavia.  See S.C. Res. 955, ¶¶11, 12, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, at 2 (Oct. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, 
¶¶12-24, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, at 2 (May 25, 1993). 
 105 Goldstone, supra note 104, at 383. 
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American support was likewise critical in ensuring the existence of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda.106 
Both of these international criminal tribunals applied the doctrine of command responsibility.  As 
the ICTR held in Prosecutor v. Blaskic,107 command responsibility attaches when “the superior has effective 
control over the persons committing the violations of international humanitarian law in question, that is, has 
the material ability to prevent the crimes and to punish the perpetrators thereof.”108  The ICTR and ICTY 
cases “emphasize . . . that the command responsibility theory of liability is premised on the actual ability of a 
superior to control his troops.”109  In the ultimate prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic in the ICTY, the prose-
cution “utilized the theory of command liability,” since “the ICTY prosecution found little to no direct evi-
dence of Milosevic’s involvement in the vicious crimes perpetrated during his rule.”110 
Following the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein by a coalition led by the United States, the U.S.-led 
Coalition Provisional Authority issued a statute authorizing the Iraqi Special Tribunal to hold members of 
Hussein’s former regime liable for human rights abuses.111  In the prosecution of Hussein, the Iraqi High 
Tribunal, applying the command responsibility doctrine, informed the former dictator, “in view of your high 
responsibility [as Iraqi leader], you are directly responsible for crimes committed against those victims and 
their families.”112 
The post-Filartiga development of the Alien Tort Statute has also recognized command responsi-
bility in civil litigation against foreign government officials.113  As the Senate explained in passing the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), “[u]nder international law, responsibility for torture, summary execu-
tion, or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts—anyone 
with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.”114  In 
Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
[t]he TVPA allows victims of violations of international law, or those victims’ represent-
atives, to bring a civil cause of action in federal district court against commanders under 
the international law doctrine of command responsibility, [which] makes a commander 
liable for acts of his subordinates, even where the commander did not order those acts.115 
The court continued to explain, 
                                                                
 106 See S.C. Res. 827, ¶¶12-24, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, at 2 (May 25, 1993). 
 107 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 
3, 2000). 
 108 Id. at ¶¶ 295, 302.  See also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to In-
ternational Law, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 706, 719, 721 (2002) (discussing the role of command responsibility in the decisions of 
the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, taking note of the holding of Prosecutor v. 
Blaskic). 
 109 Murphy, supra note 108, at 721. 
 110 Engelhardt, supra note 102, at 791. Milosevic perished in Tribunal custody before a final conviction or ac-
quittal could be delivered by the ICTY. 
 111 See Danner, supra note 87, at 675-76 (referencing the use of the command responsibility doctrine, and the 
“abuse of position” by the Iraq Special Tribunal). 
 112 Engelhardt, supra note 102, at 797. 
 113 See Wilson, supra note 32, at 233.  The TVPA creates a substantive cause of action under the ATS for vic-
tims of torture. 
 114 Id. at 233-34 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-49, at 9 (1991)) (emphasis added). 
 115 Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002).  The litigation in Ford was not 
brought under the ATS, since the plaintiffs were American citizens. 
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The essential elements of liability under the command responsibility doctrine are: (1) the 
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander and the perpe-
trator of the crime; (2) that the commander knew or should have known, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, that his subordinates had committed, were committing, or 
planned to commit acts violative of the law of war; and (3) that the commander failed to 
prevent the commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates after the 
commission of the crimes.116 
Ford remains good law in American courts, and the doctrine of command responsibility, at least so 
far as applied to foreign government officials, has not been questioned in federal jurisprudence.  Federal 
courts in these contexts have recognized command responsibility as integral to customary international law 
and treaty obligations, and have routinely applied this understanding in litigation against foreign officials 
alleged to have had committed human rights abuses. 
Although the TVPA only allows litigation against foreign officials, recognition of command re-
sponsibility in ATS claims preceded the 1991 passage of the Act.  The TVPA was actually passed to close a 
loophole that allowed foreign nationals, but not American citizens, to sue foreign officials for torture in 
American courts.117  For instance, applying the TVPA to a torture claim against a Guatemalan military lead-
er, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Xuncax v. Gramajo “found that the foreign official 
defendant, as former Vice Chief of Staff and director of the Army General Staff, was responsible under the 
command responsibility doctrine for the atrocities committed by the military under his command.”118 
C. Kiobel and the Future of Human Rights Accountability 
On February 28, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Kiobel.  The question presented 
was the same as considered previously by the Second Circuit: are corporate actors liable for violations of 
substantive law made actionable by the Alien Tort Statute?119  This question remains unanswered; the Court 
has instead broadened the scope of Kiobel dramatically, asking whether the ATS gives federal courts juris-
diction over any case in which both parties are foreign and the alleged harm occurred outside of the territori-
al bounds of the United States.  The Supreme Court is set to decide whether Filartiga remains good law.120 
Although the issue of extraterritorial applicability of the ATS does not directly bear on the ques-
tion of command liability, Kiobel has the potential to severely roll back the American commitment to en-
forcement of explicitly universal human rights law.  A basic underlying fact of the Kiobel case echoes 
Filartiga: the defendant was a private party acting in concert with the government when the harm oc-
curred.121  Under these circumstances, a victim of human rights abuses could not reasonably expect justice in 
the courts of that country. 
International law and human rights experts have strongly pushed back against the apparent effort to 
limit the reach of the ATS.  Professor Sarah Cleveland has noted that “international law [does not] impose 
any categorical bar to adjudicating international law violations arising in another country,” and “modern in-
                                                                
 116 Id. at 1288. 
 117 See Wilson, supra note 32, at 226-27. 
 118 Id. at 234.  See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886. F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 119 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145. 
 120 See Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (No. 10-1491), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf. 
 121 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117 (describing the plaintiffs as private corporations who were “aided and abetted [by] 
the Nigerian government in committing violations of the law of nations”). 
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ternational law authorizes, and in some cases requires, the United States and other nations to exercise juris-
diction over those who commit core international law violations abroad.”122  Furthermore, Professor Oona 
Hathaway notes that there are at least twenty-one other countries that allow extraterritorial enforcement of 
international law in domestic courts.123  Dozens of briefs on behalf of human rights groups and experts have 
been filed in Kiobel in support of preserving the reach of the ATS. 
The Roberts Court can do a great deal of damage to human rights accountability by deciding both 
the corporate liability and extraterritoriality under the ATS.  While the typical Supreme Court approach is to 
decide a case on the narrowest basis necessary, there have been notable examples of the Court majority go-
ing further in recent terms.124  A holding barring corporate liability under the ATS would do critical harm to 
human rights enforcement as multinational corporations have an increasingly far-reaching role in labor, envi-
ronmental, health, and other issues across the globe which bear directly on human rights law propagated over 
the last half-century. 
As discussed above, corporate liability has deep roots in international law.  While it is possible that 
corporations at the time of the original ATS—which has been recodified in the modern era as its own 
standalone statute—were merely chartered extensions of sovereign states, Sosa explained that the interna-
tional law embodied in the ATS is not fixed as the law of 1789.  Holding corporate entities liable under a 
theory of command responsibility is crucial to ensuring that those with the most power to prevent human 
rights abuses by their employees and agents have a real incentive to do so. This is true whether the alleged 
human rights abuses occur within the territorial bounds of the United States and whether either of the parties 
is non-foreign. The human rights revolution of the twentieth century was predicated on universality.  Malfea-
sant defendants should not escape responsibility because they are sheathed in corporate immunity or because 
the human rights abuses happened in a country whose government was complicit in the alleged harm. 
III. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BINDING 
TREATY OBLIGATION 
Command responsibility precedes the post-World War II human rights revolution by at least half a 
century.  The doctrine appears in the Hague Convention of 1907, in which “one begins to see the early de-
velopment of the military command doctrine.”125  This Convention has been cited in numerous United States 
Supreme Court opinions, and has “invoked Hague and Geneva law in interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
bar on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment, as guidelines in fashioning process requirements for military tribu-
nals and in adjudicating writs of habeas corpus.”126  The command responsibility doctrine “emerged as a 
                                                                
 122 Sarah Cleveland, Online Kiobel Symposium: The Alien Tort Statute and the Foreign Relations Fallacy, 
SCOTUSBLOG (July 13, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-kiobel-symposium-the-alien-tort-
statute-and-the-foreign-relations-fallacy. 
 123 See Oona Hathaway, Online Symposium: The ATS is in Good Company, SCOTUSBLOG (July 17, 2012, 
11:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-kiobel-symposium-the-ats-is-in-good-company.  See also Oona 
Hathaway, What’s Really at Stake in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 28, 2012, 4:07 PM), 
http://afjjusticewatch.blogspot.com/2012/09/whats-really-at-stake-in-kiobel-v-royal.html. 
 124 See e,g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that the Affordable Care 
Act is constitutional under federal taxing power, with Justice Roberts writing separately to narrow Congressional Com-
merce Clause authority); Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (deciding unanimously that Betty Dukes’ class action 
could not go forward under Rule 23, while 5-4 majority went further to substantially limit class actions more broadly). 
 125 See Fenrick, supra note 89, at 112.  See also Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, Annex, Ch. 1, Sec. 1, Arts 1, 26, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 U.S.T. 631. 
 126 See David Weissbrodt and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpret-
ing and Developing Humanitarian Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (2011). 
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principle of customary international law during the [post-World War I] 1919 deliberations of the Commis-
sion on Responsibility and Sanctions.”127 
The Convention Against Torture, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1984 and ratified by 
the United States in 1994, explicitly obligates command officials to ensure their subordinates’ compliance 
with its terms.128  Rendition is explicitly prohibited,129 and government officials are required to 
ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully 
included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical person-
nel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation 
or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprison-
ment.130 
Notably, the Convention contains an Article that functions as an anti-”special factors” provision: 
“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political insta-
bility or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”131 
The Torture Convention also creates a right to a “prompt and impartial investigation, whenever 
there is a reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its ju-
risdiction.”  As a party, the United States must “ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture 
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as 
full rehabilitation as possible.”132  In other words, not only are victims of torture entitled to a fair hearing and 
due process, state parties are required to compensate individuals who have been subject to torture, and gov-
ernment officials have an obligation to prevent torture by subordinate officials.  The Convention is also ex-
plicit in its assurance that its provisions are a floor rather than a ceiling; while criminal punishment of viola-
tors and civil remedies for victims are required by the treaty, it does not “affect the right of the victim or 
other person to compensation which may exist under national law,” or “prejudice . . . any international in-
strument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.”133 
As discussed above, the U.S has a long history of applying command responsibility to litigation—
including prosecution—involving foreign officials and leaders.  American courts have recognized the doc-
trine as integral to international law to be applied in federal litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION: RECONCILING IQBAL’S SUPERVISORY LIABILITY HOLDING WITH 
BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Supreme Court in Iqbal explained that supervisory liability is a “misnomer,” and that re-
spondeat superior does not apply to claims against government officials for the actions of subordinates.  As 
discussed above, some commentators and lower court judges have taken this to mean that officials cannot be 
held liable for the actions of their subordinates.  If this were truly Iqbal’s holding, the Court would have not 
only radically departed from its own domestic law precedent, it would also have put American law in per-
                                                                
 127 Mamolea, supra note 92, at 90-91. 
 128 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art.10, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113. 
 129 Id. at art. 3. 
 130 Id. at art. 10. 
 131 Id. at art. 2. 
 132 Id. at art. 14. 
 133 Id. at arts. 1, 14, 17 (emphasis added). 
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haps irreconcilable tension with binding international law doctrine.  However, on closer analysis, the deci-
sion appears much less sweeping than an abolition of long-standing domestic and international law.  A more 
plausible reading of Iqbal, in light of subsequent Court decisions134 reaffirming the “deliberate indifference” 
standard and a presumption in favor of fealty to long-standing domestic and international law, views the fail-
ure to prevent, train, or act in mitigation of human rights abuses as a distinct legal violation. 
Iqbal did not decide supervisory liability under the Alien Tort Statute.  The Court has decided one 
case involving ATS litigation against the United States, holding in Rasul v. Bush that federal courts are not 
barred from asserting jurisdiction over ATS suits by foreign nationals against federal officials.135  While the 
decision referred to the Alien Tort Statute only in passing, the Rasul majority never mentioned the Westfall 
Act as a defense to an ATS suit.  This silence calls into question lower court decisions interpreting the West-
fall Act to foreclose ATS claims arising from the Constitution and human rights law.  Thus, Iqbal, while 
possibly tightening the requirements for asserting a human rights claim (or any claim in general), does not 
seem to have undermined the possibility of holding high-level government officials liable for clear human 
rights abuses carried about by subordinates when the requisite level of command responsibility is estab-
lished.  This fits well with international court decisions in which command liability is treated as a “separate 
offence of omission.”136  The Court further did not bar Iqbal’s Bivens claims on the basis of the “special fac-
tors” found in other cases by lower federal courts. 
Iqbal’s holding, if read properly, can be reconciled with the United States’ obligations under hu-
man rights law.  Because more recent cases, including Connick, recognize the continued viability of deliber-
ate indifference as a basis for liability of government officials, the supervisory liability rooted in internation-
al law has not been abandoned.137  Pure respondeat superior has never been the standard by which command 
liability has operated; to this extent, Iqbal is not inconsistent with prior human rights law.  So long as federal 
courts do not misinterpret Iqbal as doing away with command responsibility entirely, the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard is in line with human rights precedent.138 
Looking forward, the bigger threat to human rights litigation is the lower court jurisprudence dis-
covering new defenses to ATS and Bivens claims against government officials and private actors.  As dis-
cussed above, private and corporate actor liability is firmly ingrained in customary international law.  Fur-
thermore, international statutes, treaties, and conventions to which the United States is a party require civil 
remedies for victims of human rights abuses, in addition to criminal prosecution of offenders.  The extension 
of the Westfall Act, which never mentions the Alien Tort Statute, as a defense to human rights litigation 
brought by foreign nationals relying on clear statutory and treaty law stands in opposition to this require-
ment.  Similarly, applying unwritten “special factors” to Bivens litigation involving human rights plaintiffs 
threatens the legal obligation to provide a remedy for these types of claims. 
There are graver and more immediate threats to human rights accountability for government offi-
cials than the Iqbal language surrounding supervisory liability.  In particular, the invocation of state secrets 
by the federal government, and the federal courts’ acceptance of this argument to preemptively quash any 
                                                                
 134 See, e.g., Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350. 
 135 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
 136 See generally Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates 
or Separate Offence of the Superior, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 619, 620-21 (2007). 
 137 See, e.g., Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366. 
 138 Others have assessed the interplay of Iqbal’s new pleading standards and human rights law. See, e.g., Shep-
herd, supra note 56, at 2320 (explaining that after Iqbal, “the movement to bring human rights violators to justice must 
clear a burdensome procedural hurdle”).  This paper does not conclude that Iqbal’s other procedural holdings, or federal 
court decisions with an exceedingly crabbed approach to human rights violations, are consistent with human rights obliga-
tions; I only conclude that Iqbal’s language concerning supervisory liability can be reconciled with command liability 
precedent and legal obligations. 
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merits hearing and determination of liability, is an increasingly prevalent barrier to both transparency and 
human rights accountability for the United States.  In a range of cases, from the mistaken rendition and tor-
ture of Maher Arar to the “due-process-free assassination” of Anwar al-Awlaki, federal courts have bowed to 
the Bush and Obama Administrations’ assertions of national security privilege, crafting procedural barriers 
to plausible claims of human rights abuse.139  In both cases, the targets of alleged anti-terror enforcement 
were not provided any opportunity to contest their status or government determinations of terrorist affiliation 
in court.  While President Obama referred to the al-Awlaki assassination as “extraordinary,” Defense Secre-
tary Leon Panetta recently affirmed the Executive’s broad position that a U.S. citizen can be executed with-
out trial if the government determines that the individual is associated with anti-American terrorism.140 
American jurisprudence currently displays an asymmetry in which foreign nationals can bring for-
eign officials into federal court for alleged abuses occurring across the globe, while the courtroom doors are 
shut to claims against American officials accused of the same legal violations.  There is a widely noted re-
calcitrance on behalf of United States courts and high-level officials to submit American officials to the same 
legal scrutiny as has been directed at foreign officials in Germany, Japan, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, 
and elsewhere.  The post-9/11 U.S. legal regime and polices have produced plaintiffs alleging human rights 
abuses by American officials on an unprecedented level.  While there have been efforts to hold lower level 
officials accountable for certain incidents, such as the torture of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib and killing of 
Iraqi civilians in Haditha,141 courts have denied an adequate forum for seeking redress against high-level of-
ficials who allegedly authorized these policies.142  The withdrawal of the United States from the Internation-
al Criminal Court, after helping craft the Rome Statute authorizing the ICC and signing onto its charter,143 is 
similarly disconcerting. 
The lower federal courts’ expansion of immunity to high-level officials represents a possibly ille-
                                                                
 139 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 574, 563-64 (2d Cir. 2009); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2010).  See also Glenn Greenwald, The Due-Process-Free Assassination of U.S. Citizens is Now a Reality, SALON (Sept. 
30, 2011, 6:31 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/09/30/awlaki_6/ (discussing the assassination via drone strike of the U.S. 
born Anwar al-Awlaki, alleged to have collaborated with al-Qaeda to plan terrorist strikes against the United States). 
 140 See Adam Serwer, Panetta: Decision to Kill Americans Suspected of Terrorism is Obama’s, MOTHER 
JONES (Jan. 30, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2012/01/panetta-obama-signs-killings-americans-suspected-
terrorism; Glenn Greenwald, Leon Panetta’s Explicitly Authoritarian Decree, SALON (Jan. 30, 2012, 7:55 AM), http:// 
www.salon.com/2012/01/30/leon_panettas_explicitly_authoritarian_decree/. 
 141 See Brad Knickerbocker, ‘Atrocity’ Cases Test US Military Justice, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 
22, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1222/p01s01-usmi.html; David Johnston, Inquiry Into Abuses Ends With no 
U.S. Civilian Indictments, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/19/world/americas/ 
19iht-detain.3954041.html (discussing convictions secured against American soldiers accused of torture of detainees, 
along with failure to indict civilian contractors complicit in detainee torture).  However, the Haditha prosecutions have 
largely failed and the results have been characterized as an “insult” to the Iraqi people. See Iraqis Condemn US Haditha 
Sentence as Insult, JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=254991&R=R101. 
 142 Notably, both former President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney publicly acknowledged 
ordering waterboarding against detainees as part of “enhanced interrogation” techniques. See Steve Holland, In Book, 
Bush Strongly Defends Use of Waterboarding, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/04/us-
bush-book-waterboarding-idUSTRE6A353020101104; Former US VP Cheney Defends Iraq War, Waterboarding, VOICE 
OF AMERICA (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Former-US-VP-Cheney-Defends-Iraq-War-
Waterboarding——-128686908.html.  The federal government has historically prosecuted waterboarding as torture. See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984) (prosecuting Reagan Administration law enforcement officers for use of 
waterboarding). 
 143 See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty, American 
Society of International Law, http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm (May, 2002) (discussing the U.S. involvement in crafting 
the Rome Statute and subsequent decision not to ratify the Treaty and participate in the ICC). 
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gal barrier to human rights litigation, but is not a necessary product of Iqbal.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
does not displace the deliberate indifference standard, which is roughly parallel to the international law 
command responsibility doctrine.  The Court similarly did not extend the Westfall Act to shield federal em-
ployees from human rights claims, under the guise of “scope of employment.”  Neither did the Court create a 
new “special factor” under the Bivens doctrine, which would bar constitutional claims brought against high-
ranking federal officials by foreign victims of alleged human rights abuses.  The Supreme Court has decided, 
in very limited circumstances, to bar particular claims against federal officials for largely procedural reasons, 
such as the failure to adequately plead or a failure to overcome the qualified immunity requirement of a 
clearly established federal right.  These barriers would not exist in the context of a clear human rights viola-
tion, such as obvious torture or impermissible detention.  The regime of quasi-absolute human rights immun-
ity for high-level government officials is the product of lower federal courts crafting new law beyond what 
the Supreme Court or statutory law had previously recognized. 
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